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Abstract When people want to schedule a meeting, the agendas of the partici-
pants must be compared to find a time suitable for all of them. However,
at the same time participants want to keep their agendas private. This
paper presents a negotiation protocol which tries to solve this contradic-
tion. The protocol is implemented in the agenTa system using mobile
software agents, hereby alleviating communication overhead and allow-
ing disconnected operation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When negotiating meetings, the parties look up, communicate and
process information about each other’s agendas trying to find a moment
when they are all free to attend the meeting. Due to the private nature
of a person’s schedule, as little as possible should be revealed to any
other party during negotiation. In the end the result of the negotiation
should be known only to the participants and any other information
about a user’s agenda should remain secret.
Not only people can take part in the process of negotiating meetings.
Meeting scheduling naturally accomodates booking for the resources nec-
essary during the meeting. A schedule can be attached to meeting rooms,
projection equipment and other infrastructure elements. New meetings
can be scheduled taking into account the availability of these resources
at different moments in time.
An easy solution for scheduling a meeting is to broadcast the schedules
in clear to all participants and pick one of the suitable times according to
a common rule. Since this totally neglects privacy we avoid this solution.
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2A mutually trusted third party could be used for scheduling the meet-
ing if it receives the schedules in clear. This way the privacy is protected
with respect to the other participants but not with respect to the third
party. We also want to avoid this solution.
The aspect of security that our meeting scheduler is most concerned
with is user privacy. As such, we have tried to prevent attacks such as
spying on private data and result manipulation.
We have analyzed several existing meeting scheduling applications and
found that a common problem which needs to be solved by these systems
is managing access to a user’s agenda. For example, “Yahoo! Calendar”
[8] defines access levels for viewing and modifying an agenda entry, and
defines user groups to which these access levels are assigned. This is only
necessary because the comparison between schedules must be done by
the users themselves. Our approach eliminates the need for managing
access levels granted to individuals by designing a negotiation protocol
that is not based on users directly accessing each other’s agenda.
This paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 presents the negotiation
protocol and its analysis from a complexity and security point of view.
Sect. 3 discusses the use of mobile software agents and the implemen-
tation of our prototype “agenTa” system. Related work is described in
Sect. 4. We conclude in Sect. 5.
2. NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL
2.1. GOALS
When designing the negotiation protocol we tried to achieve the fol-
lowing goals, in order to obtain a simple but secure system: parties
should have no direct access to each other’s agenda, scheduling should
only be performed through negotiation; negotiation should only be per-
formed on a limited time span of the agenda; negotiation should only
be performed on a chosen subset of the free times; no party should rely
on another party telling it the final result; no information should be
revealed about the agendas, other than the particular time the meeting
can be scheduled.
Scheduling without direct access to the agenda is desirable because
it reduces the potential privacy threats and allows to concentrate the
concern for protection in one point: the negotiation protocol. In this
way, the user does not need to be concerned with the trustworthiness of
each of the other participants.
The restrictions of limited time span and subset of the free times
ensure that, if something goes wrong during the negotiation only a part
of the schedule is revealed. Moreover, chosing a subset of the free times
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3allows users to express their own preferences with respect to scheduling
in addition to the restrictions imposed by previous appointments.
Since the negotiating parties are assumed to be mutually distrustful,
one of the design goals for the negotiation protocol is that each party
arrives to the final result independently. Relying on another party for
learning the final result opens a vulnerability to denial of service or
misinformation by that party.
Besides information that can be inferred from the final result (“No
meeting scheduled” or “Meeting scheduled at moment x”), no infor-
mation should be revealed about the agendas. This goal protects the
privacy of the participants.
2.2. DATA REPRESENTATION
There exists a representation which reduces the problem of deciding
if the meeting can be scheduled at a certain moment to a logical AND
operation.
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Figure 1 Conversion from agenda to representation
As shown in Fig. 1, an agenda will be represented as a bit string
in the following way: for each time slot in the schedule, there is one
bit indicating whether the negotiator can (1) or cannot (0) attend a
meeting of the specified length which would start at that time. The
finer the granularity and the longer the negotiation window, the more
bits there will be in the representation.
2.3. SCHEDULING MODEL
In our model, a meeting scheduling starts with an invitation phase.
The initiator broadcasts to the invitees a set of negotiation parameters
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4such as meeting length, negotiation window (limited time span in which
to attempt the meeting scheduling) and a complete list of invitees. Each
invitee broadcasts to all others a reply indicating whether it will accept
or decline the negotiation invitation. Because broadcasts are used, no
invitee can be mislead as to the set of negotiators it will encounter in
the second phase.
In the second phase, called negotiation, the negotiators try the time
slots one by one and attempt to schedule the meeting. For each time
slot the negotiation takes place according to the protocol outlined be-
low. If the meeting was successfully scheduled the negotiators move on
to the third phase, otherwise the next time slot is tried. After indepen-
dently arriving to a result concerning a certain time slot, each participant
broadcasts the result to the others and checks whether all results coin-
cide. This allows for detection of partial failures and attacks which try
to mislead a subset of the negotiators.
In the third phase either the common result is presented to the users,
or the users are informed that no meeting can take place. If there is a
common result, users might confirm their commitment to the scheduled
time on a separate channel (e-mail, telephone), independently of the
scheduling process.
2.4. SCHEDULING A MEETING
For the purpose of this subsection we will refer to the representation
of an agenda as described earlier as “schedule.”
Instead of comparing schedules, the negotiation should be based on
comparing protected forms of the schedules. The schedules are protected
in a way which still allows scheduling to be performed by broadcasting
the protected forms to all negotiators and letting them process the data
without fear of the unprotected form to be revealed.
The binary XOR operation between the schedule and a mask is a
transformation which still allows scheduling to be performed in the sense
that the (in)equality of two or more bits is preserved when they are all
XORed with the same mask.
If all negotiators know the mask, they are able to retrieve the original
schedules easily, by unmasking the broadcasted data. The solution is to
let the mask be a shared secret, that is, all negotiators will contribute
when building it, but it will not be revealed to any of them.
The negotiation protocol then goes as follows:
1 In step one of the negotiation protocol, each negotiator chooses a
random mask, and XORs it with its schedule. This random mask
is actually a partial mask. The shared secret will be the XOR of
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5all partial masks, and is called global mask. If even one single
negotiator keeps its partial mask secret, the others cannot find the
global mask solely using their partial masks.
2 In step two of the protocol, all schedules visit all negotiators ex-
actly one time. At each visit they are masked with the partial
mask of that particular negotiator. In the end, all original sched-
ules are thus masked with the global mask, without the need for
the negotiators to disclose their partial mask. Since the schedule is
first masked with its owner’s partial mask it remains secret during
its visits.
A negotiator must be unable to identify a protected schedule as
representing its own schedule: otherwise performing XOR between
the original and the protected schedule reveals the global mask,
allowing the negotiator to retrieve all original schedules. Therefore
during the trip to all negotiators, the schedule must be forwarded
randomly between the negotiators in order to make it impossible
to trace. The schedule must have attached a list of negotiators
it hasn’t visited yet, decremented at each forwarding, in order to
prevent multiple maskings with the same partial mask.
3 In step three, all protected schedules are broadcasted. Each nego-
tiator looks independently for a time slot when all protected sched-
ules have the same value. That implies that the original schedules
are identical, too, for that time slot but does not provide any clue
whether the negotiators are free or busy for that time slot. The
clue is provided by each negotiator’s schedule for that time slot. If
the negotiator is free then, it means all negotiators are free then
and the meeting can be scheduled. For time slots when some are
busy and some are free, it is not possible to figure out who the
busy ones and who the free ones are.
Note that our scheduling protocol does not specify any form of nego-
tiator authentication. This is however needed for linking the protocol
messages to their originators. Depending on the meeting application,
the desired form of authentication can be added to the protocol.
Figure 2 shows the negotiation protocol as performed by three parties.
For easy understanding of the protocol the schedules in the simulation
are following the same route and the maskings appear to be performed
simultaneously by the three negotiators. In reality the process is asyn-
chronous (some negotiators may be idle while others are masking) and
routing is random (in the end some negotiators may have nothing to
broadcast while others may broadcast several protected schedules). An-
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6other difference is that in reality only one bit is processed at a time. If
the meeting can be scheduled in the corresponding time slot the protocol
stops, otherwise the next time slot is processed.
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Figure 2 Simulation for three negotiators
2.5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we list several situations in which the protocol would
not completely protect the privacy of the users.
Entropy attack. The reason for performing the negotiation one slot
at a time is to prevent the following attack. If the negotiation is done
on sequences of slots, when all the broadcasted masked schedules are
received, it still is possible for a party to recognize its original schedule.
It can be done by testing all the masks which transform the original
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7schedule into one of the protected forms. The correct global mask can be
recognized by the fact that by unmasking the other protected schedules
with it, bit strings are obtained which have the entropy expected from
a schedule.
Negotiating one bit at a time, with fresh partial masks for each bit
and stopping when a meeting is scheduled counters this attack because
each mask bit and schedule bit have maximal entropy.
Number of parties. When only two parties are negotiating, each
can deduce the schedule of the other based on the own schedule and the
comparison between the protected forms of the schedules. Besides that,
the global mask is straightforward to find because the original schedule
can be linked to its protected form.
Three parties are still not enough against this attack on the global
mask. When the first negotiator forwards the schedule to the second
one, it knows that the protected form will be broadcasted in the end
by the third, so it is able to link its original schedule to the protected
form and find out the global mask. Since both other schedules can be
traced back to their origin negotiators the unmasked schedules can be
associated with their users, thereby compromising their privacy.
Also for four negotiators the global mask can sometimes be found out
and the originating agents of all unprotected schedules can be deduced.
The problem is that the routes the schedules are following are still rather
short and allow the schedules to be traced. For five or more participants
the ability to trace a schedule along its route decreases as the number
of participans increases.
A possible solution is to use dummy negotiators which are always
free thereby artificially increasing the number of parties to a level where
tracing becomes infeasible. Also, techniques used in anonymous commu-
nication are a useful tool in studying and enhancing the untraceability
properties of the routing scheme [1].
Bad slots. There may be time slots for which all users are busy
and therefore all protected slots will be equal. By checking against
the original schedule each negotiator will avoid scheduling a meeting in
that slot but it will also know everybody else’s schedule for that slot
(i.e., everybody is busy). Because they constitute an infringement on all
users’ privacy we call these slots bad slots.
Rogue negotiators. A simple denial of service attack can be mounted
by negotiating based on a fully busy schedule instead of declining the
invitation.
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8Another possible attack can be performed by a negotiator who ran-
domly changes its partial mask during the negotiation of a time slot.
Since the protocol relies on the negotiators consistently using their par-
tial mask for functioning correctly, under this attack the protocol will
have unpredictable outcomes.
Goal-oriented misbehavior is also possible. A negotiator can wait to
be the last to broadcast the protected schedule(s) it has. This way it
is able to detect first when a meeting could take place. In that case it
can broadcast a false protected form, preventing the meeting from being
scheduled. It knows everybody else’s schedule for that time slot, while
the others do not.
This attack can be prevented by using time redundancy. If the other
negotiators detect the possibility of such an attack they can ask for the
round to be reiterated. Therefore, if at each reiteration one and the same
negotiator broadcasts results which prevent a meeting to be scheduled,
it is almost certain that the negotiator is performing this type of attack.
Once identified, the rogue negotiator can be excluded from further steps
of the negotiation.
2.6. COMPLEXITY
For analyzing the complexity of the scheduling we count the messages
that are sent between the negotiators. In a distributed environment
it is expected that sending messages will be much more resource con-
suming than masking or a comparison between bits. Since much of the
processing is done in parallel, bandwidth is more important.
Note that for n negotiators a broadcast is of complexity n− 1. When
an all-to-all broadcast is needed it has complexity n(n− 1).
The scheduling starts with a simple broadcast of the invitation. C1 =
n − 1. All negotiators (except for the initiator) must announce their
position towards the invitation. These broadcasts adds complexity C2 =
(n − 1)(n − 1). For getting masked, one bit must visit all negotiators
and then be broadcasted: 2(n − 1). This happens to each negotiator’s
bit in a round: C3 = 2n(n − 1). If the number of bits in a schedule is
l, after at most l rounds the protocol will end. In the check phase of
the scheduling, all negotiators broadcast their result or the fact that no
meeting could be scheduled to all others: C4 = n(n− 1). Note that only
positive results (i.e., a meeting is possible) are broadcasted. If the result
is negative, the agents automatically go to the next bit. If the result is
still negative after the last bit, it was not possible to schedule a meeting.
Therefore at most C = C1+C2+ lC3+C4 = (1+n−1+2nl+n)(n−
1) = (2 + 2l)n(n − 1) messages are sent. For example, for a scheduling
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9window of 3 eight-hour working days, granularity 1 hour (l = 24) and
5 participants (n = 5) this amounts to at most 1000 messages; for 10
participants in the same conditions, there will be up to 4500 messages
sent.
3. USING MOBILE SOFTWARE AGENTS
3.1. ADVANTAGES
Given the specific conditions of the problem at hand, mobile software
agents can bring improvements in at least two areas: network usage and
network access (see also [5]).
Due to the large number of messages that have to be sent in the meet-
ing scheduling process, agents alleviate the communication overhead by
gathering on an agent host and performing at least part of it locally,
saving time and bandwidth.
Agents are a more flexible solution than client-server based solutions.
They are loosely coupled entities, therefore their upgrade is less trau-
matic for the system as a whole.
Concerning network access agents are superior to non-agent approaches
because they allow for disconnected operation. The fact that user input
is required from users that may not be simultaneously available and po-
tentially long negotiation times stress the superiority of disconnected op-
eration over online operation which keeps underused connections open.
Disconnected operation replaces the lengthy connection by two short
connections, one when starting the task and one when collecting the
result.
3.2. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a prototype of the “agenTa” system described
in this paper.
In our prototype implementation we have used the Aglets SDK 1.1
beta 3 [4]. It is a mobile agents system development kit which was
recently released to the open source community by its creator, IBM.
The SDK contains an agent server, the API needed to write agents in
Java, examples and documentation. The prototype implementation of
agenTa has around 3500 lines of Java code.
For the inter-agent communication KQML (Knowledge Query and
Manipulation Language) was chosen. KQML was developed at the Uni-
versity of Baltimore Maryland County, and enhanced with security ca-
pabilities in [7].
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The agent’s feature of mobility is used for performing the negotiation
with all agents on the same negotiation host, by local communication.
Each user’s scheduling application is modular, the user interface, the
agenda management and the negotiation being performed by distinct
intercommunicating agents.
3.3. EXTENSIONS
Currently, situations like the one in which a participant cannot at-
tend the meeting are dealt with by allowing a participant to decline the
invitation. More realistic situations include retreating from the nego-
tiation while it is in progress to avoid blocking the others, relaxation
of the schedules such that the chance to schedule a meeting increases
or scheduling meetings of teams, in which only several members of a
team need to be free in order for the meeting to be scheduled. In order
to address these more complex situations, higher level protocols can be
devised, which repeatedly use the basic protocol outlined in this paper.
For interoperability and easy interfacing with existing agenda man-
agers, a well defined open interface to agenTa still has to be designed.
In essence, an agenda manager which wants to use agenTa to negotiate
a meeting in a secure way will only need to send a KQML message with
the schedule to agenTa and receive a KQML message with the result
from agenTa.
3.4. SECURITY ISSUES
It is generally considered that there are four classes of security is-
sues specific to agents [3]. The first is how to protect the agent host
against a malicious agent. The solutions lie in the area of authentication
and authorization of the visiting agents. The second issue is protecting
agents in transit through the network. This class of problems also has
well-established solutions, including VPNs (Virtual Private Networks)
between agent hosts. The third issue is protecting the agents against
each other. The solutions for this class of problems are more diverse,
ranging from relying on the host to ensure proper insulation between
agents to using cryptographic techniques for agent authentication and
digitally signing messages. The fourth class of problems refers to the
protection of an agent against a malicious host it is running on. Since
the host executes the agent and has access to its data and code this
class is the hardest to solve and we are not aware of any general so-
lutions yet. As other research indicates, the best we can hope for is
protecting agents against goal-oriented behavior alterations by the host.
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Protection against random behavior alteration and denial of service by
the host appear to be achievable only with tamper-resistant hardware.
These security issues are typically addressed by the mobile software
agent framework. The Aglets framework provides solutions for the first
three classes. Agents are isolated against each other and communicate
only through messages. Proxy objects are used when agents need refer-
ences to other agents. Agents travel on the network through encrypted
channels. Protection of the host against agents is achieved by authenti-
cating signed incoming agents and establishing appropriate Java sand-
boxes, as configured in a security policy file. Our “agenTa” system
currently does not provide a solution against the fourth class of security
problems.
4. RELATED WORK
Alternative approaches and future enhancements of our secure meet-
ing scheduling system can be found in some related work in the area of
computer security and cryptography.
The whole purpose of the negotiation protocol is for parties to jointly
compute the logical AND of schedule bits coming from each party, with-
out each party having to disclose their own bits. Secure Distributed
Computation (SDC) [2] lends itself perfectly to this problem. General
secure distributed computation tends to be less feasible than special
purpose protocols like the one presented in this paper. However, no
comparison has been made in this case.
In step two of the negotiation protocol, a global mask which nobody
knows is built from the partial masks of each participant. This is actually
an example of a secret sharing mechanism. It is possible that other
existing secret sharing mechanisms are suited for the meeting scheduling
application.
Step two of the negotiation protocol relies on the random forwarding
of data along all the negotiators in such a way that it can not be traced
back. This is very similar to techniques used for providing anonymous
communication, e.g., on the Internet [1].
The meeting scheduling agents currently have to carry private infor-
mation when going to a negotiation host. This host has to be trusted
as long as the agents cannot be protected from it. The execution of
encrypted functions [6] has the potential to protect agents from hosts
they run on, and e.g., allow them to digitally sign messages on untrusted
platforms.
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5. CONCLUSION
This article explores the problem of scheduling a meeting without
revealing the schedules of the participants. A suitable representation of
the schedule is chosen and a protocol for performing the negotiation is
presented. The advantages of implementing the protocol with mobile
software agents are discussed. Some shortcomings of the protocol are
analyzed, solutions and further improvements are suggested.
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